The issue of abortion is discussed with reference to the claim that people have a right of control over their own bodies. Do people "own" their own bodies? If so, what would be entailed? These questions are discussed in commonsense terms and also in relation to the jurisprudence of Hohfeld, Honore, Munzer and Waldron. It is argued that whether or not women are morally and/or should be legally entitled to have abortions, such entitlements cannot be derived from a general moral (...) entitlement to do what we will with our own bodies since there is no such entitlement. Whether or not we "own" them, we can have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies. (shrink)

This is a continuation of and a development of a debate between John Keown and me. The issue discussed is whether, in Britain, an unpaid system of blood donation promotes and is justified by its promotion of altruism. Doubt is cast on the notions that public policies can, and, if they can, that they should, be aimed at the promotion and expression of altruism rather than of self-interest, especially that of a mercenary sort. Reflections upon President Kennedy's proposition, introduced into (...) the debate by Keown, that we should ask not what our country can do for us but what we can do for our country is pivotal to this casting of doubt. A case is made for suggesting that advocacy along the lines which Keown presents of an exclusive reliance on a voluntary, unpaid system of blood donation encourages inappropriate attitudes towards the provision of health care. Perhaps, it is suggested, and the suggestion represents, on my part, a change of mind as a consequence of the debate, a dual system of blood provision might be preferable. (shrink)

Originally published in 1970 this title commemorates the men and ideas that started, inspired and established a pioneer institution in British psychiatry. Based on the impetus of Freudian and related innovations after the First World War, the Tavistock Clinic offered treatment, training and research facilities in the field of neurosis, child guidance and later on group relations. Dr Dicks, who had been associated for nearly forty years with the work and personalities that helped to develop the Tavistock venture, describes the (...) struggles and capacity for survival of the clinic. He shows how, belonging neither to the older classical psychiatry nor to orthodox psychoanalysis, and suspect to both, the Clinic nevertheless became increasingly used by the rest of the profession as a psychotherapeutic resource. Dr Dicks describes the influence of the Tavistock on the medical, psychological and social work scene both before and after the Second World War, and assesses its achievements as a centre of psycho- and socio-dynamic thinking. The Tavistock is shown as a pioneer _sui generis_, launching psychosomatic research and initiating the exciting ventures in social psychiatry associated with the Army in the Second World War. As the Tavistock was the outcome of work with shell-shock victims in the first war, so its offspring, the Institute of Human Relations, was the natural continuation of the military effort in man-management, morale and group dynamic studies. The book includes an account of the inter-relationship between the Clinic, now part of the National Health Service, and the Institute, a private corporation. Still going strong as part of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust today this is an opportunity to revisit its early history. (shrink)

A study of the place of human sexuality in religious systems indicates a possible universal stress on sexual attraction. This could be explained by using the theories of Richard Dawkins and other sociobiologists: the philandering male and the coy female express the best strategies for the survival of the “selfish gene.” Closer analysis of four religious systems throws doubt on these theories. In some systems the strategies are contradicted while in others there is stress on cooperative restraint rather than on (...) survival through selfish propagation. The principal objection to the sociobiological approach is its assumption of conflict between the sexes. (shrink)

Death of motor neurones following invasion of the central nervous system by poliovirus may result in paralysis of specific muscles. Virulence may be tested by injection into monkeys by routes which bypass natural infection. Transmissibility is also very important, but cannot be measured, only inferred. An infection may lead to immunity or paralysis. In epidemics, the highest incidence among children 0-2 years was 2% and among those over 10 years was 25%: these figures fit a model of genetic susceptibility of (...) homozygotes and heterozygotes with phenotypic susceptibility increasing with age. Hypogamma-globulinemics, some neonates and pregnant women are more susceptible than others. Intra-muscular injections may increase the risk of paralysis. Strenuous exercise and IM injections given when poliovirus has already reached the spinal cord can increase the severity of paralysis or convert a non-paralytic attack to paralysis. Although vaccines reduced polio in temperate countries, polio was thought to be no problem in the tropics. Since 1977 polio has been recognised as a massive problem in the third world: because it affects babies and very young children, it is properly infantile paralysis. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, poliomyelitis presented a scientific and medical challenge of a complexity similar to that of AIDS now. Research on polio, mainly in the US, gradually became focussed to solving basic questions, but was held up by the lack of suitable laboratory techniques. The financing of the research and the wide range of basic topics funded were the model for later medical science. The problem of polio, at least in the wealthier temperate countries, has been (...) solved by the use of vaccines. Many fundamental questions about the mechanism of the disease remained unsolved and this lack of knowledge has contributed to many unfortunate accidents. The history of polio has many lessons for AIDS researchers. (shrink)

In their account of passive euthanasia, Garrard and Wilkinson present arguments that might lead one to overlook significant moral differences between killing and letting die. To kill is not the same as to let die. Similarly, there are significant differences between active and passive euthanasia. Our moral duties differ with regard to them. We are, in general, obliged to refrain from killing each and everyone. We do not have a similar obligation to try to prevent each and everyone from dying. (...) In any case, to be morally obliged to persist in trying to prevent their deaths would be different from being morally obliged to refrain from killing all other people even if we had both obligations. (shrink)

The author defends himself against an attack by Smith and Bopp on his views on smoking and taxation. The theory that, on the grounds of equity and/or fairness, smokers should pay via taxation on tobacco for the health care costs of treating smoking-related medical conditions is discussed and shown to be defective. It is argued that the fundamental mistake that Smith and Bopp make is to confuse and conflate the separate issues of whether particular taxes are fair and whether they (...) are justifiable. The conclusion is reached that an excise duty on tobacco is a good tax. It is a non-fair or even an unfair tax but it is justified on grounds other than fairness. (shrink)

Coggon’s remarks on a previous paper on active and passive euthanasia elicit a clarification and an elaboration of the argument in support of the claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The relevant moral duties are different in nature, strength and content. Moreover, not all people who are involved in the relevant situations have the same moral duties. The particular case that is presented in support of the claim that to kill is not the same (...) as to let die is based upon a rejection of consequentialism. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Philologus Heft: Ahead of print.

The arguments of Van Niekerk and Van Zyl that, on the grounds that it involves an inappropriate commodification and alienation of women's labour, commercial surrogate motherhood (CSM) is morally suspect are discussed and considered to be defective. In addition, doubt is cast on the notion that CSM should be illegal.